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ACCOUNTING 
PRINCIPLES 
AND THE 
INVESTMENT 
CREDIT 
In 196a Congress enacted the invest-
ment tax credit to stimulate industry's 
investment in capital assets. The Ac-
counting Principles Board, in its Opin-
ion No. 2, first decided that the credit, 
for account ing purposes, should be 
spread over the life of the related prop-
erty rather than being all taken into 
income the year the property was pur-
chased. A year and a half later Opinion 
No. 4 was issued, stating that this 
spreading or "deferral" method was still 
the preferred method, but that the cur-
rent income or so-called "flow-through" 
method was also acceptable. Then, in 
September 1967, the Board published 
the exposure draft of an Opinion on ac-
counting for income taxes, the invest-
ment credit portion of which called for 
reversion to the deferral-only position. 
However, in December the Board set 
aside that portion for further study, 
leaving the alternatives still open. 
Your editors have felt that it might 
be useful to query Mr. Queen an about 
this somewhat perplexing sequence of 
events, and at the same time to gain 
further insight about how accounting 
thought develops. 
Interviewer: Mr. Queenan, throughout 
the more than five years since the in-
vestment credit was enacted, when Mr. 
Powell was on the APB and then you, 
Haskins & Sells has been an energetic 
leader of the minority group 011 the 
Board that said "flow-through" is the 
proper accounting method. Would you 
say this action by the Board in setting 
aside the deferral-only proposal is a 
victory for our H&S position? 
Mr. Q u e e n a n : No, I don't think I 
would. The majority of the Board still 
favors deferral. On the other hand most 
of the thousand corporation executives 
and practitioners, and many of the edu-
cators, who wrote to the Board about 
the matter favor flow-through. So the 
question is still entirely undecided. 
But I don't like the connotation of 
the word "victory." I don't think you 
should picture this as two opposing 
groups battling to a decision. That is 
not how accounting thought moves for-
ward, at least not in my judgment. 
How did the Finn come to adopt its 
position? 
We spent a great deal of time analyzing 
all of its aspects. In the beginning, the 
law required that the credit be de-
ducted from the cost of the property 
for figuring depreciation, so with the 
corporation tax rate at 52 per cent, a 
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little over half of the credit eventually 
went back to the government. We 
agreed this half should be deferred, but 
not the other half which the company 
kept free and clear—without necessity 
to take further action or to incur addi-
tional cost. 
We looked at this other half as it 
fitted into the existing framework of 
accounting concepts. We saw it quite 
simply as a reduction in income tax ex-
pense. This, to us, was an indisputable 
business fact. And as a matter of fact, 
most of those favoring deferral now 
agree. They used to view it essentially 
as a reduction in cost of the property, 
but now they only say it is related to 
the property and its use. 
Why did they change? 
I don't know that the reasons are clear-
cut. The fact that the tax law was 
changed in 1964 to provide that the 
credit was not to reduce the basis of 
the property probably had something 
to do with it. In our view, of course, 
that change made the entire amount of 
the investment credit a reduction of 
tax expense, not just half of it. 
Now, under present accounting con-
cepts, revenue, or a reduction in ex-
pense, is recognized—that is, picked up 
in income—when no further action need 
be taken or further cost incurred in 
realizing it—when the company has an 
unconditional right to it. The invest-
ment credit is realized as soon as there 
are current revenues that give rise to 
the tax expense that the investment 
credit reduces. So there is no reason, 
within the accounting framework, to 
defer it. 
Then how do the proponents of the 
deferral method support their position? 
Well now, I don't know that it's fair 
to them for me to be explaining their 
position. However, I can express my 
difficulty with it. They seem to depend 
heavily on something they say is an 
accepted concept: that income results 
from the use of property, not from its 
acquisition. With this idea in mind, 
they say that the investment credit— 
which they thus classify as income—is 
primarily associated with the property 
acquired, and that it should therefore 
be allocated to the periods in which the 
property is used. 
That seems like a rather plausible posi-
tion to take. 
Oh, it does have an appeal, and it did 
particularly when the argument was 
that the credit was a reduction in the 
cost of the property. But when you 
examine it, it just doesn't hold water. 
First, I think the idea that "use rather 
than acquisition of property produces 
income" is a generalization or an ob-
servation relating to revenue recogni-
tion, ra ther than expense reduction. 
Second, the idea that the credit is asso-
ciated with the property is not perti-
nent, in our view. Many factors are 
associated with the use of assets—the 
amount of maintenance costs, for ex-
ample—but nobody has suggested that 
such costs be charged to income in pro-
portion to depreciation charges. 
Third, it is quite a strained view to 
look on the credit as "income" from 
the government. But even if it were 
"income," then it seems inescapable 
that it would have to be considered as 
earned when there had been compli-
ance with the statutory provisions. Ex-
cept for the remote possibility that 
there might be a significant amount of 
recapture, compliance with the statu-
tory provisions, in most cases, is imme-
diate. So the reason for deferral would 
not exist. 
These are technical objections. But 
something that more deeply concerns 
me is the philosophy behind this de-
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ferral position. I can only see in it a 
belief that the tax reductions that arise 
from the investment credit should be 
leveled, that there is something inher-
ently wrong in the bunching of the 
credit that can occur when capital asset 
purchases are higher in some years than 
in others. I find this philosophy in a 
number of places in the argument made 
for deferral. For instance, one stated 
objection to flow-through is that it 
may result in increasing or decreasing 
net income solely by reason of the 
timing of acquisitions. Another is that 
management may time their acquisi-
tions — and thus their credits — as a 
matter of business policy. Also it is 
feared that the recent increase in the 
allowable amount of the credit will 
even increase these fluctuations. 
To me, this philosophy is absolutely 
wrong. What the effects may be on net 
income or on the pattern of earnings 
does not furnish the starting point for 
determining the accounting for a busi-
ness fact. It is the other way round: 
you account for business facts by their 
natures and net income is the result of 
the accounting for all of its components. 
May I go back for a moment? When it 
was evident in 1962 that the majority 
of the Board wanted "deferral," why 
did we persist in our position? 
If you mean after Opinion No. 2 was 
issued why didn't we recognize the 
deferral method as the only generally 
accepted practice as the Opinion re-
quired, that was because it quickly be-
came overwhelmingly evident to us 
that the flow-through method also was 
widely accepted. The diversity of views 
that had existed before the Opinion 
was issued persisted, and the SEC said 
it would accept flow-through. 
I t was not our belief t ha t the re 
should be al ternat ive methods . But 
Weldon Powell, who was Board chair-
man at the time, could see no consensus 
among the members, and there was no 
basis in experience for general accept-
ance of either method alone. So he 
favored going through an aging process 
that might show us which one method 
would gain general acceptance. 
Now, if your question means why 
didn't we remove our dissent from the 
Opinion before it was published, then 
I would say that to remove it would be 
to undermine the whole structure. The 
recording of dissent if it exists gives 
credibility to the positions taken. After 
all, if you believe your position is logical 
and practicable, and no one has been 
able to show you where you're wrong, 
you can't just give in for the sake of 
outward unanimity. When the Board 
is split as widely as it was—and is—on 
the investment credit, then it must 
consider whether the matter it's work-
ing on is really ready for a definitive 
answer. 
It seems to me that being logical is a 
matter of being reasonable, too, and it 
might have been reasonable and logical 
back in 1962 just to have accepted the 
investment credit as a property cost re-
duction. After all, the main thing is 
whether people understand it or not, 
and that treatment seems eminently un-
derstandable, even if it doesn't fit into 
the accounting framework. A red traffic 
light means stop, but if we changed it 
to blue and everyone agreed that meant 
stop, what's the difference? 
Well, as a matter of fact that's right, so 
long as you make the stop lights blue 
everywhere. But what would more 
likely happen is that you'd have blue 
meaning stop at one intersection, but 
then there would be some special rea-
son for having orange at the next in-
tersection, somebody else would want 
yellow at the next, and so on. And 
that's just the mix-up you'd have in 
accounting if you tried to decide each 
issue by itself. 
When the Accounting Principles 
Board was formed in 1959 it was hoped 
that an accounting framework could be 
rebuilt that would avoid such situa-
tions. It was intended that the Board 
would produce—through the findings of 
research studies—a framework of basic 
accounting principles, conventions, 
postulates. Then as new types of busi-
ness transactions or situations came 
along, they could be analyzed for their 
accounting characteristics and given 
treatment that fitted in with the frame-
work already established. 
But apparently this hasn't happened? 
No, it hasn't, at least not to the extent 
that we had hoped. There are some 
reasons for this that now seem obvious. 
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The manpower requirement, for one 
thing, was great and the availability of 
competent people with time to spend 
on accounting research was small. This 
shortage exists to the present time. 
Partly for this reason, some of the re-
search studies have been undertaken 
by accounting firms. Also, as it turned 
out, we really didn't have in any one 
place an inventory of accounting prin-
ciples as they currently existed, and 
this has had to be compiled. Then, too, 
the Board h a r d l y had t ime to get 
started on these basic studies when cur-
rent account ing questions raised b y 
new business situations had to be an-
swered. The investment credit was one 
of these, but it has been followed by a 
number of others — accounting for fi-
nancing leases, for example — each of 
which needed answering urgently, even 
before the basic framework could be 
established. 
These problems of time—and money 
—are ones that we can foresee solutions 
to. The new Accounting Research As-
sociation of the AICPA, which all ac-
counting linns are asked to support, is 
a Step forward. However, there is a 
problem that is less obvious but more 
fundamental. And it presents a real 
challenge. The Board has to find the 
proper relationship between deductive 
reasoning, which gives order and con-
sistency to the structure of accounting 
theories, and the testing of theories for 
their practicability, which makes them 
useful. The Institute research studies 
published in the early 19605 dealt with 
important matters, pursued largely 
through deduct ive research. But a 
number of their conclusions have not 
been fully tested in practice or com-
prehensively appraised in relation to 
their usefulness. How to get this test-
ing and appraisal is a pressing question. 
Would you illustrate that? 
The investment credit is an example 
where the testing has resulted in dif-
ficulties. And somewhat the same thing 
has just happened with the Board's pro-
nouncement in 1966 that when a com-
pany issues convert ible d e b t there 
should be an accounting for the value 
of the conversion privilege. That was 
in paragraphs 8 and 9 of Opinion No. 
10. The questions that have been raised 
in the testing are so substantial that the 
Board has withdrawn the effectiveness 
of these paragraphs pending further 
study. 
I don't mean to imply by this that 
the APB should not take positions in 
new areas, and certainly it should con-
tinue to push for a narrowing of dif-
ferences. What I am saying is that to 
avoid disorder the process must go for-
ward at a pace which permits thought-
ful consideration of intertwined com-
plexities. I think this was done with 
Opinion No. 8 on pension cost account-
ing. W e moved forward—not as far as 
some would have liked, possibly—but 
with consideration of all factors and 
close attention to what would be useful 
in practice. And I think that Opinion 
7 
lias accomplished significant account-
ing improvement in a highly complex 
area. 
You mention "highly complex area." 
Does solving accounting problems get 
tougher the more complex the business 
transaction? 
Usually, because the more complex the 
transaction, the more areas of account-
ing principles it is likely to affect. On 
the other hand, the conceptual area in-
volved may be relatively clear-cut and 
yet prove the most difficult hurdle to 
get over — b e c a u s e the a c c o u n t i n g 
framework I talked about before has 
not been fully developed. 
We must always remember that ac-
counting is not an end in itself—it is 
useful only when it is communicating 
business information. And communi-
cating means that the person on the re-
ceiving end has to understand what is 
being told to him. 
isn't that another of accounting's big 
problems, trying to communicate with 
people who don't understand account-
ing? 
Yes it is. There are so many levels of 
understanding and such a diversity of 
needs: those of the "average" stock-
holder, the banker, the financial analyst, 
the management accountant. Take the 
investment credit again. Under the 
flow-through method there is no ques-
tion that a company's income is going 
to be affected by the ups and downs of 
the amounts of credit to which it is 
entitled. And the person who reads only 
the net income line in the income state-
ment is going to suppose the ups were 
good years and downs were bad years. 
On the other hand, under the deferral 
method, that same person is going to 
see income recorded in future years 
that really has no relation to operations 
of those years. 
I think we have always gone on the 
p r e s u m p t i o n that the r e s p o n s i b l e 
reader of financial statements can be 
properly charged with reading them in 
total. Now, maybe we should be easing 
away from this presumption, but in 
any event, our ef forts should be 
directed toward greater clarity in ac-
counting presentations. There is also 
much we can do toward explaining ac-
counting matters to non-accountants, If 
we do this with enthusiasm we can 
accomplish a great deal. 
But will there ever be an answer for 
the person who just won't read any-
thing but the last line? 
Oh, that may be possible. We have of 
recent years been greatly preoccupied 
with measuring income. This is where 
our most useful service has seemed to 
be, just as fifty years ago measuring 
balance sheet values seemed most im-
portant. It is quite conceivable to me 
that we could, however, in the evolu-
tion of our goals, turn to measuring 
earning power—a trend line of income 
rather than income by itself, within 
stated limits and specified reliability, 
of course. That could give the "aver-
age" stockholder a useful figure on 
one line. 
How far in the future might that be? 
Well, I'd say still pretty far. But it is 
illustrative of the wide future account-
ing has. That is why we should not find 
ourselves oppressed by single issues 
like the investment credit that seem 
difficult to solve. For every such ques-
tion that comes before the Board there 
are hundreds that are being answered 
quietly and effectively by companies 
and their accountants within the frame-
work of concepts that have already 
been established. 
I think we should remind ourselves 
that our profession has undertaken a 
very major responsibility in our social 
and economic structure. Recognizing 
that, we should expect the issues we 
deal with to be big ones, too. 
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